The fractured crescent: What’s next for Iran’s strategy in Middle East?

The so-called “Shia Crescent,” Iran’s strategy of influence stretching across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, is facing unprecedented challenges. Tehran invested enormous resources—political, financial and military—into preserving Assad’s rule and to carve out a forward operating base for its war efforts in Lebanon, often at the expense of its own struggling economy.

However, Israel’s swift dismantling of Hezbollah’s leadership and key assets coupled with a loss compounded by the collapse of the Assad regime, unraveled Iran’s long-constructed strategy, leaving the Islamic Republic’s regime in a precarious position as years of influence and billions of dollars evaporated within a matter of weeks.

From Aoun’s election to HTS’s slow but steady gains in the security and diplomatic arenas, Tehran faces mounting questions about its next moves in the Middle East amid significant setbacks in Syria and Lebanon and growing pressure from the United States under the incoming Trump administration.

Negotiation or confrontation

The United States’ strategy toward Iran under the first Trump administration represented a pivotal shift. Centered on a policy of ‘maximum pressure,’ Washington enforced stringent sanctions and bolstered its military presence in the region, ultimately culminating in the targeted killing of top Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani. The approach, likely to be continued according to Trump designated aides’ public comments, marked a significant departure, demonstrating that the U.S. could pursue its objectives without incurring substantial retaliation, an approach that Israel has recently mirrored in its own operations.

Now as the second Trump term looms, rhetoric in both Washington and Tel Aviv have openly deliberated the possibility of military strikes targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and critical facilities, while Pezeshkian and Donald Trump have signaled openness to negotiating a new nuclear agreement, though neither has disclosed specifics about its terms.

These discussions, paired with Iran’s defiance, underline the gravity of the standoff. During a visit from Iraq’s Shia-aligned Prime Minister on this Friday, Ayatollah Khamenei emphasized the expulsion of U.S. forces and strengthening of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has responded with large-scale military drills aimed at protecting sensitive sites.

Despite the defiance, analysts suggest Iran is unlikely to drastically escalate its nuclear activities unless President Trump intensifies the maximum pressure campaign. “Iran’s strategic goal now is to buy time to reassess and rebuild its collapsed regional strategy,” explained Ali Bakir, a nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council. “By signaling a willingness to engage in transactional deals with the U.S., Tehran may attempt to de-escalate tensions while positioning itself for future shifts in American leadership,” the assistant professor at Qatar University’s Ibn Khaldon Center tells Türkiye Today.

Among the shifting forecasts, Ellie Geranmayeh of the European Council on Foreign Relations notes, ‘Unlike the first Trump administration, Europeans are now more aligned with U.S. policies, having gradually adopted a harder stance against Tehran.’ With the window to enforce U.N. sanctions under the nuclear deal set to close by October, pressure is mounting. This convergence of European and American strategies could significantly narrow Iran’s options, raising the stakes for future negotiations or potential confrontations.

Political expert Ismail Yasa highlights Tehran’s dilemma: “If pressured further, Iran must choose between retracting its expansionist policies to avoid conflict or escalating tensions through proxies in Iraq and Yemen. Recent remarks from Khamenei suggest the latter path is likely, reinforcing Iran’s reliance on regional proxies as a buffer against direct confrontation. However, this strategy faces significant challenges, as growing resistance in the region compounds Tehran’s precarious position.”

Proxy puzzles

Once the most critical of its proxy strongholds, Iran has suffered significant losses in Lebanon and is limited to minor projects far from its former ambitions in Syria.

Analyst Ismail Yasa, in talks to Türkiye Today, underscores the gravity of this loss, stating, “Iran completely lost in Syria and largely in Lebanon. If Lebanon’s newly elected president succeeds in ensuring that ‘weapons will only be in the hands of the state,’ Iran will lose entirely in Lebanon as well.” 

He further points out that Tehran’s attempts to leverage groups like the PKK/YPG and remnants of the old Syrian regime to incite chaos. However, Yasa noted, “The likelihood of success is low, given the strong presence of actors like Türkiye, which is committed to maintaining security and stability, and coupled with the international community’s reluctance to see further refugee crises.”

Meanwhile, Bakir cautioned against Iran’s potential to reshape its agenda in Syria by rallying factions that could use Israel’s occupation of Syrian territories as a rallying cry. “Such moves might allow Iran to carve out a new sphere of influence in Syria, much like it has in Lebanon—though this would likely unfold over the medium to long term,” Bakir warns, underscoring the broader implications of Iran’s ambitions.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s diminished influence adds another layer of complexity. Joe Hammoura, a Lebanese researcher and Middle Eastern affairs specialist, explained, “Hezbollah still enjoys significant support within the Shia community, but the repercussions of the recent war have impacted both its environment and its power and presence.” He added that the party’s rapid withdrawal from Syria, following the collapse of Assad’s regime, “rendered its sacrifices there futile.” Hammoura also drew attention to the increasing dissent within Lebanon regarding Hezbollah’s actions, pointing out, “a significant portion of Lebanese society is against Hezbollah’s monopoly on resistance and its unilateral control over decisions related to warfare,” speaking to Türkiye Today.

Adding to Hezbollah’s challenges, logistical constraints now limit its ability to rearm. “Acquiring weapons from Iran has become harder today since the U.S. controls all banking transfers, Israel controls the Lebanese airspace, and the U.N. force in Lebanon (UNIFEL) controls the sea,” Hammoura observed.

Aoun’s recent election, according to Hammoura, shows that “Hezbollah currently lacks the strength to oppose any international or even local decision.”

These dynamics, coupled with the loss of Syrian support, have suggested that Hezbollah’s future and its role in Iran’s broader regional strategy will at least be survival projects focused on existing.

Iraq & Yemen: Tehran’s last strongholds

In the past, U.S. and Iranian interests occasionally aligned in Iraq. If they diverge, Iraq could once again become a hotspot. According to Yasa, “Iran is likely to play the Daesh/IS card to stoke fears of terrorism and pressure the U.S. and Europe, using Iraq, Syria, and Yemen as platforms. Syria’s new security and intelligence forces recently announced they had detained Daesh operatives plotting a bombing near the Sayyida Zaynab shrine in Damascus—an operation many expected Iran to have a hand in planning.

However, shifting dynamics suggest a growing desire in Iraq to distance itself from Iranian reach. “Iraq is actively seeking to leverage support from Türkiye, Gulf states, and the U.S. to shield itself from Iran’s negative influence,” Bakir explained.

Strategic initiatives, such as the agreements between Türkiye and Iraq, as well as broader projects like the Qatar-UAE-Türkiye corridor, could help Iraq in this endeavor. However, Bakir cautioned “the complexity of the region, including factors such as Iranian-backed militias, presents substantial obstacles. Whether Iraq can ultimately break free from Iran’s sphere of influence remains to be seen, but its current calculations suggest an intention to do so.”

Despite their resilience, the Houthis are also under increasing pressure from the Saudi-led coalition. Ismail Yasa observed, “Iran’s proxy organizations in Iraq and Yemen are likely to face tough times ahead. The Houthis, despite their resilience, cannot withstand prolonged pressure indefinitely,” and Iran has escalated tensions in Yemen to such an extent that it may no longer be able to calm the waters. 

One of the more surprising developments in recent years has been the thaw in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Bakir stressed that the durability of this rapprochement depends on numerous external factors, from U.S. policies to the fate of Abraham Accords. For now, the mutual benefits of this understanding outweigh the costs.

Rebuild or retreat

ran’s once-formidable network of regional proxies, long a cornerstone of its strategy, now risks becoming a liability, with its ripple effects threatening stability within the regime itself.

Looking ahead, Tehran’s approach will likely hinge on calculated risks and a measured dose of strategic patience. Efforts to recalibrate its regional strategy face daunting obstacles: mounting domestic economic turmoil, the weight of international sanctions, and growing struggles within its proxy networks leave little room for missteps.

How Iran chooses to respond, whether through negotiation, proxy escalation, or strategic retrenchment, will be a critical factor in its ability to withstand the pressures of “coercive diplomacy” and “maximum pressure.”

As regional actors assert themselves and international pressure mounts, Tehran’s next moves will be closely watched, shaping the future of the fractured crescent.