US sanctions target Türkiye-based firms allegedly spying for Russia
The U.S. Department of the Treasury on Thursday imposed sanctions on 275 individuals and entities allegedly aiding Russia’s defense sector, including multiple Türkiye-based networks accused of espionage activities.
This extensive action targets suppliers across 17 countries, disrupting efforts to support Russia’s military-industrial base amid its ongoing war efforts.
“The United States and our allies will continue to take decisive action across the globe to stop the flow of critical tools and technologies that Russia needs to wage its illegal and immoral war against Ukraine,” said U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo.
“As evidenced by today’s action, we are unyielding in our resolve to diminish and degrade Russia’s ability to equip its war machine and stop those seeking to aid their efforts through circumvention or evasion of our sanctions and export controls,” Adeyemo said.
Sanctions imposed on alleged Turkish firms linked to Russian defense operations
As part of this coordinated action, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 14 Türkiye-based entities and nine individuals for allegedly assisting Russia’s defense sector through espionage and technology acquisition efforts.
These sanctions reportedly follow extensive consultation with the Turkish government.
Alleged espionage by Mirex Network for Russian defense
Mirex, led by Turkish national Ozgur Hasan Celik, is at the center of this action. Mirex is accused of working with Russian defense affiliates to manufacture and assemble military equipment in Türkiye.
Celik’s involvement with GNO Investment and Mirex BG, alongside Rostec representatives in Türkiye, led to these designations under E.O. 14024.
Alleged GRU-linked Türkiye-based New Way Group
New Way Group, a Türkiye-based company, allegedly facilitated the supply of U.S.-origin microelectronics for Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).
New Way’s designation under E.O. 14024 is part of the broader sanctions on Turkish networks, allegedly aiding Russian intelligence and defense procurement.
Sanctions expand to alleged espionage in technology and manufacturing sectors
The U.S. Treasury’s actions include Türkiye-based entities allegedly obtaining and supplying critical components to Russia, such as Sanlitun, which is accused of securing electronic parts for Russian defense use.
Alleged agents Alexander Vladimirovich Kalinin and Ahmet Furgan Albayrak reportedly collaborated on orders involving espionage techniques, securing components for Russian state defense.
Greek national Petros Nikolaos Contoguris (Contoguris) allegedly worked with Kalinin at Sanlitun to arrange for the export of hazardous material using U.S.-designated Russian metals company Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Evraz Vanadi Tula (Tula).
Contoguris allegedly designed a convoluted and obfuscated way to import the substance to evade international sanctions. Contoguris also worked with Kalinin to provide refurbished gas turbines to Russia through Sanlitun, and Contoguris and Kalinin have supported multiple Russian customers.
Türkiye-based company BRK International is a logistics services company that has allegedly exported items on the CHPL to Russia, including electronic integrated circuits, which are critical to the production of advanced Russian precision-guided weapons systems.
Türkiye-based companies BP Exports and Sinerji Industrial Equipment have also allegedly exported electronic integrated circuits to Russia.
BRK is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the transportation sector of the Russian Federation economy. BP and Sinerji are being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the technology sector of the Russian Federation economy.
Broader implications of Türkiye’s alleged defense sector espionage
The sanctions also target Turkish suppliers allegedly exporting nitrocellulose, CNC tools, and other components used in weapons manufacturing.
Companies like Tool Company Gut, SLD Logistics, and AYTT CNC are accused of supporting Russian military manufacturing, making these designations critical to the U.S. effort to curb Russia’s defense supply chain.
Russia-based freight logistics company LLC AM Logistics (AM Logistics) has allegedly taken delivery of multiple shipments of nitrocellulose, a chemical compound that is a key ingredient in modern gunpowder, explosives, and artillery shells, in Russia. Türkiye-based SLD Logistics has allegedly conducted several large shipments of nitrocellulose to Russian companies, including AM Logistics.
Russian national Daria Aleksandrovna Shachenok (Shachenok) is the director and owner of AM Logistics and the 50% owner of SLD Logistics.
Russia-based Tool Company Gut Limited Liability Company (Tool Company Gut) has allegedly imported computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools and components, high-priority items crucial to Russia’s war efforts, from Türkiye-based entities.
Tool Company Gut has allegedly supplied tools and parts to entities in the Russian defense sector and has continued to contract and interact with Russian defense sector entities.
Russia-based Limited Liability Company Mobula, which is co-located with Tool Company Gut, has allegedly imported interchangeable tools for hand- or machine tools from Türkiye-based entities. Türkiye-based Modulsan has allegedly exported manufacturing articles for making metal-cutting tools to Russia, including to Tool Company Gut.