Demographic decline in Türkiye: Fears and policies explained

On April 19, 2025, Türkiye’s Minister of Family and Social Services Mahinur Ozdemir Goktas raised an alarm, stating, “Today, we are at an alarm level. Our fertility rate is 1.51. The replacement rate for the population is 2.1. Right now, Türkiye is not renewing itself. We are aging.”
President Erdogan echoed this stark warning on demographic decline in Türkiye following a cabinet meeting, declaring, “The population issue is increasingly becoming a matter of national survival.” The country’s leadership is now prioritizing declining birth rates on the political agenda.
Earlier in January 2025, the Turkish government declared the year as “Family Year”, signaling a national recognition of the importance of family dynamics in addressing population concerns. Conservative Turkish policy makers are increasingly viewing fertility rates not as isolated statistics but as part of a larger, interconnected issue involving traditional institutions such as marriage and family. The prevailing sentiment suggests that for fertility rates to stabilize, the traditional concept of “family” must remain anchored in its historic form.
However, Türkiye has undergone significant transformation in the past two decades, a shift that complicates the simplistic application of these older ideals to modern societal realities.
Journalist Halime Kokce highlights, “The issue of population decline is not just a problem for the Turkish state, but for the world. Türkiye has rapidly entered the aging spiral and now has a fertility rate approaching that of European countries.”

Why are declining fertility rates a concern for Türkiye?
Population growth has noticeably slowed across the globe. During the 1960s, it grew at roughly 2% annually, but today, it has dropped below 1%. According to United Nations projections, humanity may reach near-zero population growth around 2100, marking a historically unprecedented demographic plateau.
This shift carries significant implications for economic structures, social security frameworks, and cultural norms. Countries worldwide are re-examining their policies to navigate an aging demographic and shrinking workforce, requiring substantial economic and social adjustments.
While population decline is a global issue, proposed solutions vary depending on where in the world you are. In Europe, for instance, the population crisis is often framed around issues such as the collapse of insurance systems and migration debates.
Meanwhile, in countries like the U.S., China, and Türkiye, the conversation takes different directions.

Is there a point of consensus on the issue of demographic decline in Türkiye?
From an economic standpoint, raising children has transitioned from a beneficial economic investment, particularly in agricultural societies, to a considerable financial burden. Raising a child from birth through university can cost an average family roughly 15-20 times their annual income, prompting families to delay or forego childbirth altogether.
Many individuals believe that these financial pressures significantly influence parental decisions, leading many couples to prioritize economic stability over expanding their families, thereby contributing substantially to declining fertility rates worldwide.
However, the situation is either the same or worse in developed and wealthy countries as well. Hence, the issue goes beyond just affording or not affording.
One key sociological factor linked to declining birth rates is the rise in women’s workforce participation. Globally, fertility rates among university-educated women are about 30% lower than those with only primary education, largely due to delayed marriage and childbearing driven by career ambitions.
While these developments are undeniably beneficial from a gender equality perspective, they simultaneously contribute to lower fertility rates, reinforcing demographic shifts toward aging populations and potential labor shortages.
Modern cultural trends that come in hand with the economic system emphasizing individual fulfillment, consumption-oriented lifestyles, and career progression have seemingly diminished traditional family structures and decreased birth rates.
Urbanization exacerbates this situation, as living spaces in urban areas typically become smaller and less suitable for raising larger families.
According to sociology professor Ergun Yildirim of Istanbul Zaim University, capitalist modernity reshapes family roles significantly in the country: “Capitalist work life and industrialization have radically altered traditional family roles. Women and men increasingly perceive child-rearing as burdensome, homes turn into temporary lodging, and aspirations toward career advancement, comfort, and leisure activities like vacations have overtaken childbearing priorities.”
Political responses to Türkiye’s accelerated demographic transition
Türkiye’s demographic transition reflects global trends, but at an accelerated pace. According to Murat Yilmaz, a member of Türkiye’s Presidential Social Policies Board, “The 2023 data from the Address-Based Population Registration System (ADNKS) indicates Türkiye’s population growth rate has dropped to 0.11%, and the total fertility rate now stands at just 1.51, far below the replacement level of 2.1.”
This rapid demographic transition, condensed into roughly 15 years compared to Europe’s slower 60-year process, highlights Türkiye’s vulnerability to substantial socioeconomic pressures arising from an aging population and shrinking labor force, demanding immediate and coordinated policy interventions.
Türkiye’s ongoing discourse regarding population growth reflects structural societal changes beyond mere politics. Professor Ergun Yildirim points out that while Türkiye has actively debated these demographic concerns, the root causes are fundamentally tied to broader societal transformations influenced by modernization and capitalism rather than solely political agendas.
Conversely, Murat Yilmaz emphasizes that Türkiye’s recent establishment of the Population Supreme Council and the Family Institute demonstrates institutional recognition of demographic challenges. However, he criticizes the insufficient political attention from entities beyond President Erdogan, suggesting broader political engagement is required.

Economic consequences of declining and aging populations
The demographic shift toward older populations imposes severe pressures on social security systems. Fewer active workers must financially sustain an increasing number of retirees, creating unsustainable dependency ratios. Governments face difficult decisions such as raising taxes, cutting pensions, or increasing retirement ages to sustain social security funding.
This situation is notably visible in countries such as Japan and Italy, where demographic aging has led to significant fiscal and economic stress, highlighting potential future scenarios for Türkiye if proactive measures are not undertaken.
However, what concerns Türkiye’s leading team is more about economic growth and productivity challenges.
A robust population growth traditionally supports economic dynamism by expanding the labor supply and consumer demand. Countries experiencing demographic stagnation often grapple with prolonged economic slowdowns.
According to the Solow Growth Model, sustained economic growth requires continuous labor force expansion, capital accumulation, and technological innovation.
With a declining labor force, Türkiye risks economic stagnation unless it significantly accelerates capital investment and technological advancements—a challenging yet necessary path to maintaining economic vitality.
Also, demographically older societies demonstrate lower capacities for risk-taking and entrepreneurial activities, potentially leading to reduced economic innovation and stagnation, especially in a developing and high-risk country like Türkiye.
Existing Turkish policies emphasizing symbolic incentives or controversial public campaigns largely overlook economic realities confronting young families. Superficial financial aids or politicized campaigns against caesarean sections fail to tackle root economic insecurities such as housing affordability, employment instability, and educational costs. Türkiye has also changed its traditional understanding of family with the new generations.

Criticism of pronatalist reactions in right-wing politics
The incentives for population and fertility rate come with an ideological baggage, independent of their factual side. Critics argue that the demographic debate, especially within conservative circles, often reflects an ideological obsession rather than genuine societal concern.
In the U.S., for instance, pronatalist policies promoted by right-wing figures like Elon Musk and Donald Trump have sparked controversies. Pronatalism unites traditional “family values” conservatives.
This phenomenon prompts critical views suggesting that pronatalist rhetoric frequently masks broader anxieties over changing gender norms, immigration, and demographic shifts, potentially obscuring genuine social policy needs behind ideological posturing.
In that context, Turkish right is targeting the gender norms rather than immigration.
What Türkiye can learn from global approaches on demographics
To effectively address declining birth rates, Türkiye needs comprehensive and structurally supportive policies focusing on economic stability, affordable housing, work-life balance, and accessible childcare services.
France’s successful demographic policy illustrates the importance of systemic support, including extensive childcare services, parental leave, flexible working arrangements, and targeted fiscal incentives. Scandinavian nations like Sweden and Norway have similarly adopted family-friendly measures that emphasize gender equality and work-life balance, contributing positively to fertility rates.
Meanwhile, Japan provides a cautionary tale, showcasing the limitations of purely financial or nationalist approaches. Despite extensive financial incentives, deeply rooted societal norms, such as excessive work hours, poor work-life balance, and gender inequalities, continue to suppress birth rates significantly.
As Kokce points out, “If Türkiye is serious about its ‘Century of Türkiye’ vision, the subject of population will be one of its key factors.”