A glance at Türkiye in NATO: Wild card or staunch ally?

Ankara has been closely involved with NATO since the alliance’s inception. The first step in countering the Soviet threat came with the signing of the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948, by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. However, as the exclusion of the United States was deemed impractical, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, officially establishing NATO.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s territorial and strategic demands over the republic, particularly regarding control of the Istanbul straits, fueled Turkish security concerns. Seeking closer ties with the United States under the Truman Doctrine, the country applied for NATO membership in 1950 but was denied. Despite sending 4,500 troops to fight in the Korean War that same year, its second application was also unsuccessful.

By 1951, however, the growing Soviet on American interests prompted Washington to reassess Türkiye’s strategic significance. The combat success of Turkish forces in the Battle of Kunuri during the Korean war further bolstered its standing. Finally, on Feb. 18, 1952, Türkiye was formally admitted to NATO.

Türkiye builds modern military through NATO

Joining NATO, along with the investments under the Truman Doctrine and additional military assistance, enabled Ankara to build a capable and modern military. It also provided the republic with much of the recognition it had long sought from its affiliation with the West.

It gave Turkish officials, both civilian and military, a seat at the table, enabling them to weigh in on security concerns along with their Western allies. Most significantly, NATO membership allowed Ankara to punch above its military and economic weight.

Türkiye, in its commitment to strengthening NATO’s military presence, has hosted numerous strategic bases on its soil. Incirlik and Kurecik, among other military installations, have been of critical importance for NATO’s deterrence in the region.

It was afterall the Americans who would push for Türkiye to be further incorporated into the European security infrastructure, especially under the Clinton administration in the 1990s.

Ankara’s willingness to play a military role in crucial NATO missions such as Kosovo and Afghanistan amplified its voice within the alliance. Consequently, many U.S. previous administrations until later in the 2000s had placed special emphasis on addressing Ankara’s security concerns.

Lobby work

Following years of cooperation, challenges emerged. In 2023-2024, anti-Türkiye lobbies opened its NATO membership to debate. The unusual aspect of this campaign was that it was initiated and propagated by professionals linked to the Israeli lobby, such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the Turkish Democracy Project—an entity unaffiliated with NATO member state Türkiye itself.

These lobbying professionals operate within a network of well-funded, dark-money groups that advocate U.S. foreign policy positions in the Middle East, aligning with the security interest of Israel and cooperating countries.

However, instead of capitalizing on Türkiye’s strategic advantage, the U.S. succumbed to the influence of its internal lobbies, inadvertently pushing Türkiye toward alternative alliances. During NATO’s recent Scandinavian expansion after the Russian invasion, Türkiye’s most fundamental requests—such as ensuring that new member states would not harbor individuals involved in terrorist attacks against Türkiye—were misrepresented as Ankara attempting to sabotage NATO through its membership.

Additionally, although U.S. officials were well aware of the threats posed by the SDF, a U.S.-backed armed wing of the YPG terrorist group, to Syria and Türkiye, lobby groups leveraged Türkiye’s counterterrorism operations to discredit its position within NATO.

Absent NATO allies when needed

For decades, Türkiye was one of six NATO nations that hosted U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, including 90 B61 gravity bombs. The readiness of these nuclear weapons—measured in weeks or months rather than hours—provides little strategic value. However, Türkiye has consistently argued that a credible NATO nuclear deterrent is essential to the alliance’s collective defense, positioning itself as one of NATO’s more assertive members.

Up until 2019, Türkiye sought an air defense system within NATO, but except for Spain, no NATO member was willing to protect their long-term ally against imminent threats. Consequently, when Türkiye turned to Russia for its air defense needs, the same lobby professionals accused Türkiye of defying NATO. Notably, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Greece’s procurement of Russian air defense systems and other military goods went unchallenged.

In reality, the nation has been the flag bearer of NATO’s struggles, regardless of the region or issue in the last decade. In Libya, it was Turkish intervention that reversed the near-capture of the country by Bear Brigade’s Wagner forces. In Syria, Türkiye patiently fought Assad forces for years, weakening Russian influence in the region and especially in the Mediterranean. If asked, Ukrainians would affirm Türkiye’s critical role in countering war and Ankara long called for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, as is the case in Syria.

Had Türkiye been supported in the Caucasus and Central Asia, more stability not less would have significantly increased. Nevertheless, Türkiye, despite not being geographically close to Central Asia, continues its efforts to position itself. Going a step further, it can be said that Türkiye is preparing the Middle Corridor as the only viable alternative and equally shared by all regional partners.

NATO vs terrorism

The country has played a leading role not only in NATO’s strategic maneuvers but also in its fight against terrorism, yet it has never been properly acknowledged or defended against accusations from non-NATO countries.

It has been an active member of the Global Coalition Against Daesh since the beginning and remains the only NATO member to have directly fought Daesh terrorist group on the front lines. The number and rank of Daesh leaders eliminated by Turkish forces underscore this fact.

From both a military and diplomatic perspective, Ankara remains one of NATO’s most committed members. If every country contributed as much as Türkiye, NATO’s global standing would be significantly stronger.

The changing NATO

Following former U.S. President Donald Trump’s shift in trans-Atlantic policy, “things have changed.” NATO has urged the European Union and Türkiye to improve their relations, as the U.S. withdrawal from European security forced European capitals to reassess their alliances.

Recently, Brussels has been actively exploring ways to enhance cooperation with Türkiye and other non-EU partners as part of a broader European defense strategy.

Trump’s threats to withdraw U.S. security guarantees from European NATO allies, alongside his attempts to rebuild relations with Russia and reduce support for Ukraine, have unsettled EU capitals. In response, European nations have increased their defense spending and, in some cases, advocated for working in a “coalition of the willing” with non-EU countries such as Norway and the U.K.

Adding to the evolving discourse, comments from influential figures such as Elon Musk, who has floated the idea of the U.S. leaving NATO, have intensified debates about the alliance’s future. In this shifting geopolitical landscape, Türkiye has the opportunity to redefine its role within a transformed NATO.