Who’s who? The self-rebranding of Jolani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

The capture of Aleppo and Hama by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has brought the attention to Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the prominent figure at the helm of Syria’s most powerful opposition group. 

In a rapid and unprecedented offensive, his forces with the help of Türkiye-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) seized Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, from President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and Hama thereafter, marking a significant shift in the prolonged Syrian conflict. Al-Jolani, once a shadowy figure tied to al-Qaeda, now finds himself under international focus as his forces push for territorial expansion and the consolidation of power.

Al-Jolani’s background, early years

Born Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1982, al-Jolani grew up with strong ties to Syria. His family hailing from the Golan Heights fled the Israeli occupation in 1967, later this origin became his nom de guerre as ‘al-Jolani’. He returned to Syria in 1989.

Growing up in Mezze, an affluent district of Damascus, he worked at a grocery store in his early years, where he also discreetly received religious training at a mosque in Damascus. His father was a Nasserist Arab nationalist who was imprisoned three times by Syria’s Baath regime.

Al-Jolani’s early life in Damascus was marked by an education that included time at the spent in a media faculty before leaving to join the fight against U.S. forces in Iraq in 2003. In an interview with CNN, he explained his decision, saying, “There was a massive war in Iraq that deeply stirred people’s emotions prompting many to go there.”

Al-Jolani’s path took a pivotal turn when he joined al-Qaeda in Iraq, a move that eventually led to his capture by U.S. forces in 2006, while he was forging early ties with extremists networks. Imprisoned for five years in facilities such as Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, Jolani drafted a 50-page strategy document while there in prison, advocating for avoiding sectarian conflict in Syria and focusing solely on opposing the Assad regime.

He was released in 2011 and returned to Syria at the outset of the civil war, and by 2012, he had established Jabhat an-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate that would come to play a major role in Syria’s opposition.

Initially aligned with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Jolani’s group split from the Daesh in 2013, rejecting its global caliphate vision. This marked the beginning of his focus on nationalizing the fight, culminating in the formation of HTS in 2017. By distancing HTS from al-Qaeda, al-Jolani aimed to position the group as a nationalist movement rather than a transnational extremist entity.

HTS on formation

In its early years, his group Jabhat al-Nusra relied on significant funding from Gulf donors and financed its operations through high-profile kidnappings of Western journalists and smuggling oil, extortion and other illicit activities. These methods enabled rapid expansion, with the group amassing 5,000 fighters within a year.

Al-Jolani’s forces were active across Syria, conducting operations in Hama, Homs, Latakia, Damascus and Raqqa. Their attempts to capture cities brought them into fierce confrontations with various factions. By 2014, after intense clashes with Daesh, al-Nusra was forced to withdraw from Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. This retreat marked a pivotal shift in strategy as al-Jolani refocused the group’s efforts on the Idlib-Aleppo-Hama triangle, which soon became its new operational stronghold.

During its campaigns, al-Nusra carried out suicide attacks targeting the Assad regime. Reports indicate these attacks included bombings of intelligence buildings in Damascus and assaults on civilian Alawite and Kurdish villages. Despite such allegations, al-Jolani has consistently denied targeting civilians and sectarian politics.

By 2016, the outskirts of Aleppo had become a key base for al-Nusra’s operations. The group’s strength grew as it absorbed foreign fighters fleeing from both al-Qaeda and Daesh. This influx of fighters, combined with strategic realignments, positioned al-Nusra as a dominant force in the Syrian opposition.

Governance and Rule in Idlib

HTS’s governance in Idlib, managed through the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), has been a mixed bag. While the group has provided much needed civil services, education, healthcare, and infrastructure, it has also faced criticism for suppressing dissent. Activists and independent monitors have reported disappearances, live ammunition used in public spaces, and the monopolization of economic resources.

Despite these challenges, HTS has implemented reforms in response to public discontent. Internal policing has been restructured, and elections to the General Shura Council have been announced. Al-Jolani’s rhetoric emphasizes a pragmatic approach to governance, claiming a commitment to Islamic principles without the rigid enforcement seen in groups like Daesh.

During the relative peacetime of cease-fire years, the leader of the city, Jolani, was seen acting like the head of civil administration. In an attempt to rebrand himself, Jolani hosted American journalist Martin Smith in 2021, giving him a tour around the city and stating, “We haven’t posed any threat to Western society.” Pointing to a bomb-damaged building, he claimed he was near the site during the bombardment and highlighted the risks of his public appearances, citing threats from Daesh, the Assad regime and Russian forces.

In his recent explanations regarding the group’s military success, he pointed out the discipline and experience they had from those times of forming institutions in Idlib and surrounding areas.

Jolani in the Idlib book fair (left), and – visiting the Police College officers (right).

Control over Idlib & relations with Türkiye

In January 2017, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani established Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). That same month, the Astana talks between Türkiye, Russia and Iran commenced. Shortly after, Idlib was declared a “de-escalation zone,” leading to the concentration of various jihadist factions in the region. Although the fall of Aleppo forced al-Jolani to withdraw from the city, he redirected his forces to Idlib, aiming to solidify control there. He leveraged the Astana process to his advantage.

The Astana agreements increased Türkiye’s role and presence in the region, indirectly benefiting HTS. The biggest military presence in the region, Türkiye, established 12 observation points in Idlib, which HTS strategically chose not to disrupt. Al-Jolani viewed Türkiye’s presence as a security guarantee in that sense. Over time, HTS developed a pragmatic relationship with its neighbor.

The group also took control of the vital Bab al-Hawa border crossing, giving it significant influence over humanitarian aid distribution to civilians in the area. These moves bolstered HTS’s dominance in Idlib, allowing al-Jolani to consolidate power further.

HTS’s relationship with Türkiye is characterized by this pragmatic cooperation and underlying tension. While Türkiye designates HTS as a terrorist organization, it has engaged indirectly with the group to stabilize the region and prevent Russian-backed Assad forces from advancing into Idlib and to prevent Syrian opposition clashing with each other. This balancing act allows Türkiye to maintain influence in northwest Syria while avoiding any endorsement of HTS, which is still going on. 

Upon the controversies highlighted Western partners, Ankara decided to freeze the assets of his formerly closest ally, Abu Maysara al-Qahtani, who was assassinated in a suicide bomb attack in Idlib in April 2024. Meanwhile, however, President Erdogan praised the march of Syrian opposition to Homs, wishing for the continuation of their progress.

Vision for Damascus, beyond

In the wake of Hama’s capture, al-Jolani has articulated a vision that attempts to reconcile HTS’s fighters’ origins with a more inclusive governance model. According to statements highlighted by Crisis Group’s Dareen Khalifa, al-Jolani proposed that Aleppo and Hama be overseen by a transitional body, with HTS and other armed groups withdrawing from civilian areas. Bureaucrats would be invited back to their roles, and the city’s diverse cultural and religious fabric, including Muslim and Christian communities, would be respected.

Additionally, al-Jolani has hinted at the possibility of dissolving HTS to create unified civilian and military institutions that reflect Syria’s societal diversity. He also recently stresses the significance of the instutions in every media appearance possible. While these proposals suggest a significant shift, their feasibility remains uncertain, given HTS’s history and entrenched jihadist ideology.

National and International Impact

As the leader of the largest opposition force in Syria, al-Jolani’s decisions will have lasting implications. His efforts to rebrand HTS as a nationalist entity and a potential governing force reflect a calculated bid to gain legitimacy both domestically and internationally. However, HTS’s designation as a terrorist organization by key global players, including the United Nations, the United States and Türkiye, complicates this ambition.

Regardless of his stated intentions, al-Jolani’s leadership ensures that HTS remains a pivotal player in Syria’s conflict, shaping the future of opposition-held territories and influencing the broader trajectory of the country’s ongoing war.