‘Russian NATO’ losing influence in Central Asia

Even as Russia stages a series of military drills with its allies in Central Asia, Moscow’s hold over a region it considers its backyard appears to be growing increasingly tenuous.

Bogged down by its all-out war on Ukraine, now dragging through a third year, Russia is visibly losing its historic role as the key power broker in both Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The fate of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a military alliance of ex-Soviet states, highlights the challenges facing the Kremlin as it seeks to maintain and advance its geopolitical sway across Eurasia.

Often referred to as “Russian NATO”, the alliance was formed in 1992 to fill the security vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But three decades later, the bloc has been struggling with “serious issues of competitiveness and viability,” Armenian analyst Hakob Badalyan told Agence France-Presse (AFP).

Yerevan is boycotting the organization, though it has remained a formal member.

It accuses the CSTO – and therefore Moscow – of abandoning it amid conflict with arch-foe Azerbaijan.

It is not the first membership challenge faced by the CSTO, which comprises Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, alongside Russia and Armenia.

Baku left in 1999, alongside Caucasus neighbor Georgia. Uzbekistan followed suit in 2012.

Both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan ignored calls to rejoin the alliance in 2023.

‘Fewer resources’

Russia’s difficulties across Central Asia and the Caucasus stand in contrast to its successes in forging and deepening alliances with the likes of China, India, Iran, North Korea and several African countries amid its invasion of Ukraine.

Badalyan sees those developments as connected.

“At war with Ukraine, Russia has far fewer resources to fully play its role as the CSTO’s military-technical leader,” he said.

Others suggested that the CSTO still has a role in the region, though the idea of it acting as a powerful Russian alternative to NATO is questionable.

For instance, the alliance intervened in Kazakhstan in 2022, where predominantly Russian “peacekeeping forces” helped quell deadly anti-government riots and stabilise President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s regime.

At the time, Russia and the CSTO positioned themselves as guarantors of stability for allied authoritarian regimes – a scenario that now seems impossible to replicate.

The CSTO’s role in the region has also shifted following the Taliban’s military takeover in Afghanistan in 2021.

According to Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the Russian Institute of CIS Countries, the group has helped by “ensuring the stability of Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan” over the last three years.

“If there haven’t been any serious conflicts involving Afghanistan and Central Asian nations, it’s largely due to Russian military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,” he said.

Moscow and its closest ally Minsk hope military drills in Kyrgyzstan last week, and Kazakhstan next week, will show the alliance still has geopolitical relevance.

“By holding these exercises, we show the international community and all our enemies that we are ready to face any threat,” Belarusian official Gennady Lepeshko said in the Kyrgyz town of Balykchy, where last week’s drills took place.

But the alliance appears split even on the definition of who those “enemies” are.

While Russia sees the West as an existential threat, Central Asian states and Armenia are strengthening ties with the United States and Europe.

Aside from Belarus, none have backed Moscow’s war on Ukraine.

And even Minsk – financially, politically, economically and militarily reliant on Moscow –does not recognise Russia’s territorial claims over eastern Ukraine.

Limitless friendship

Western countries are not blind to the possible geopolitical opening in the region.

This week, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Central Asia, where his hosts urged him to invest in energy and transport infrastructure to connect the region to Europe, bypassing Russia.

In July, Central Asian states held their first joint military exercises without Moscow, while Armenia hosted joined military drills with the United States.

The region is also being courted beyond the West, including the military.

Kazakhstan hosted special forces from Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey for drills in September, held under the banner of “limitless friendship.”

China is expanding its security influence in Central Asia, both through bilateral agreements and its own regional bloc, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Drawing on cultural ties with fellow Turkic-speaking nations, Ankara has also boosted arms supplies.

Sensing the challenge, there is little chance of Russian President Vladimir Putin simply accepting his country’s diminished influence in a region it ruled over for decades.

“The time has come to begin a broad discussion on a new system of collective security in Eurasia,” he said back in June.