Devlet Bahceli: From nationalist hawk to advocate for terror-free Türkiye

Devlet Bahceli, the leader of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) since 1997, has been a hawkish figure and ardent defender of state’s security policies against terrorist groups and terror-linked political movements. However, since October 2024, he leads a process that can leave a mark in Türkiye’s modern political history for decades to come. His call on terrorist organization PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan led to a historic call on PKK to disarm and disband.

Who is Devlet Bahceli?

Born on Jan. 1, 1948, in the rural district of Bahce, Osmaniye Province, Devlet Bahceli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), hails from a well-established Turkmen family.” His father, Salih Bahceli, was a prominent farmer and merchant in Türkiye’s nationalist heartland Osmaniye.

Bahceli completed his primary education in Osmaniye before moving to Istanbul for his secondary studies. He later attended the Ankara Economic and Commercial Sciences Academy, graduating in 1971 with a degree in economics and commerce. He pursued further studies at Gazi University in Ankara, where he earned a doctorate in economics from the Institute of Social Sciences.

In the legendary Turkish political program “32. Gun”, he was once asked why he had never married. He responded, “The timing of marriage and death can never be predicted.”

Statesman, man of the state

During his university years, Devlet Bahceli became actively involved in nationalist movements. In 1967, while still a student, he contributed to the founding of the Idealist Hearths (Ulku Ocaklari), a nationalist youth organization. Between 1970 and 1971, he served as the secretary-general of the National Turkish Students’ Union.

In 1987, young Devlet Bahceli transitioned from academia to full-time politics, joining the Nationalist Labor Party (MCP), which was later renamed MHP. Following the death of the party’s founder, Alparslan Turkes, in 1997, Bahceli was elected as the MHP’s chairman, a position he has held since July 6, 1997.

Prior to Bahceli’s rise to leadership within the MHP, the 1996 Susurluk incident exposed the deep-state structures within Türkiye, along with alleged links between MHP-affiliated paramilitary groups and organized crime. The crash claimed the lives of an Istanbul deputy police chief, a sitting MP, and Abdullah Catli—a prominent figure within the Idealist Hearths movement who was also allegedly working for Turkish intelligence.

The incident ignited widespread debate over the existence of a “deep state” in Türkiye. In an apparent effort to distance MHP from allegations of mafia involvement, Bahceli, after defeating Alparslan Turkes’ son in the party’s 1998 leadership race, took decisive action. He shut down nearly half of the party’s Idealist Hearths-affiliated youth branches, reducing their number from approximately 1,500 to a significantly lower count.

The alleged ties between the MHP and organized crime trace back to the Cold War era and NATO’s covert operations. In this context, Türkiye’s “Counter-Guerrilla” structure and Operation Gladio have played a significant role.

Operation Gladio was reportedly a NATO initiative aimed at establishing clandestine paramilitary groups in European countries to counter a potential Soviet invasion. In Türkiye, this structure became known as “Counter-Guerrilla” and was established in 1952 under the name “Mobilization Inspection Board.” It was later rebranded as the “Special Warfare Department (Ozel Harp Dairesi).”

Alparslan Turkes, the founder of MHP, received special warfare training in the United States for NATO and played a key role in setting up the Special Warfare Department upon his return to Türkiye.

Born of a kingmaker

Under Devlet Bahceli’s leadership, the MHP achieved significant electoral success. In the 1999 general elections, the party secured 17.98% of the vote, doubling the party founder’s rate, becoming a key coalition partner in the government led by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. He became kingmaker there and served as deputy prime minister from 1999 to 2002. 

During those years, the first fracture within the coalition government emerged on Feb. 13, 1999, following the capture and extradition of PKK terrorist group’s ringleader Abdullah Ocalan to Türkiye, sparking a heated debate over his possible execution.

As tensions over the issue extended into the ranks of Prime Minister Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DSP), the party’s parliamentary group saw its numbers dwindle by half in July, as several MPs resigned in protest of Ecevit’s refusal to step down.

Amid these developments, Devlet Bahceli, leader of the coalition’s second-largest partner, called for early elections—setting in motion a chain of events that would ultimately pave the way for the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and reshape Türkiye’s political landscape.

The MHP failed to surpass the electoral threshold in the early election it had called for. However, he regained parliamentary representation in the 2007 elections, with himself elected as a deputy from Osmaniye. He has since been re-elected into Turkish Parliament in subsequent elections, maintaining his influence in Turkish politics.

Name of surprise announcements

Initially a vocal critic of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the ruling AK Party, Devlet Bahceli’s stance shifted following the July 15 2016 coup attempt. This shift led to an alliance between the MHP and the ruling AK Party, culminating in the formation of the “People’s Alliance” for the 2018 general elections. This alliance has continued in subsequent elections, with the MHP providing crucial support to Erdogan’s administration.

After previously opposing the presidential system proposed by Erdogan, Bahceli shifted his stance following the events of July 15. In a “surprise” statement during the MHP parliamentary group meeting on Oct. 11, 2016, he called on the AK Party—and by extension, Erdogan—to formally submit the presidential proposal to the Turkish Parliament. This move effectively marked the beginning of Türkiye’s strengthened presidential system.

Arguing that the “de facto situation must be given a legal framework,” Bahceli endorsed the transition to a presidential system. The process swiftly gained momentum, and the so-called “Turkish-style presidential system” has been in place ever since.

In a pivotal move in 2018, he again called for an early election. Despite claims that his party, MHP, shifted allegiance due to declining support, it emerged from the snap elections with an increased share of the vote.

Advocacy for “terror-free Türkiye”

Bahceli’s unexpected statements, which often bewildered many, were not limited to these.  In 2021, he directly urged the Court of Cassation’s Chief Prosecutor to expedite the process of shutting down the Kurdish-oriented Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The first call that pushed the pro-Kurdish nationalist and separatist party—now rebranded as Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM)—to the political margins came from him.

Months before the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, he unexpectedly initiated a dialogue process in October 2024, seemingly out of nowhere. In a bold opening move, the MHP leader proposed allowing Ocalan to address the Turkish Parliament, signaling an attempt to control the narrative from the highest level.

In a landmark development, Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned ringleader, called for the group’s disarmament and dissolution in February 2025. The announcement marked a potential turning point in the four-decade-long conflict that has claimed over 40,000 lives.

Bahceli, as the leader of the MHP and a key ally of Erdogan, has played a significant role in this new phase. His support for the peace initiative reflects a pragmatic approach to resolving longstanding issues and achieving a terror-free Türkiye. 

Some journalists closely following the process claim that Ankara’s nationalist kingmaker’s mysterious portrayal of his role in the intelligence-initiated process serves to preserve his credibility in every statement he makes. 

Unlike in his early days of leadership, the lingering questions about his ties to organized crime—exemplified by his support for an amnesty law that secured the release of crime boss Alaattin Cakici, whom he called a “comrade in the cause”—only add to the enigma surrounding him.

The partner of the government’s call regarding Ocalan, which represents Türkiye’s example of the “Nixon Goes to China” theory—the idea that a hardline leader’s peace-oriented move is more acceptable to the public—was met with confusion. Yet, it was not heavily questioned, as many assumed he must have had a calculated reason behind it.

In the days when the terrorist organization declared a cease-fire following his call for its “self-dissolution,” he continued making unexpected moves, even reaching out to another key political symbol of the separatist movement, Selahattin Demirtas. In response, Demirtas publicly shared a prayer for his health.

Currently, despite refraining from appearing in media photos, the leader’s health is confirmed to be in good condition.

A figure long defined by his hardline nationalism, Bahceli now finds himself at the center of a paradox: Once the fiercest opponent of reconciliation, he is now shaping the very course of a peace process that few ever expected him to endorse, with a call to a man whose execution he once tirelessly pursued.