What’s the public sentiment on peace process in Türkiye following ringleader Ocalan’s call?
Figures overseeing the PKK’s disarmament process.
The latest push calling for disarmament of the terrorism group is set to reshape Türkiye’s political landscape. One of the aspects of the dialogue process is its top-down nature, involving only political leaders and largely ignoring public opinion.
The approach has raised questions about how Kurdish and Turkish communities perceive recent developments. In the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) first peace process with terrorist group PKK, unlike the current one, techniques such as wise man committees were used to engage grassroots support.
The potential constitutional changes and new political formations that may arise as a result of this shift could redefine Türkiye’s governance model. “This is not just about a security issue; it is about reorganizing the entire political sphere,” Seren Selvin Korkmaz, co-director of Istanbul-based think tank IstanPol Institute, asserted.
In talks with Türkiye Today, Nagehan Alci added another angle. “(President Recep) Tayyip Erdogan wants to go down in history as the leader who ended the PKK. Remaining in power might be a consideration, but this is also about legacy-building,” she stated.
Speaking about Syria’s geopolitical landscape, Yildiray Ogur, a Turkish journalist who has been following the process very closely, said, it starts from where it ends.
“The last peace process collapsed largely due to developments in Rojava. The situation has now changed dramatically in Türkiye’s favor, creating an opportunity to revisit the issue under different circumstances,” he remarked.
‘DEM Party had no alternative but to embrace this process’
Mercator-IPC Fellow Seren Selvin Korkmaz sees the project as a strategic reshaping of Türkiye’s internal political stage. She emphasizes that if the PKK is no longer a factor, the political environment will inevitably shift. “Once the PKK ceases to be a concern, the way the DEM Party engages in politics will change, and in turn, nationalist parties will have to adapt,” she explains.
“This would mean a complete change in the political arena for the 2023-2024 elections.” The analyst also highlights how the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), previously sidelined into the opposition due to increasing pressure, might now emerge as a third alternative.
One of the critical questions surrounding the dialogue process is the role of the DEM Party. While some critics argue that the party’s alignment with the initiative is solely due to instructions from PKK’s imprisoned ringleader Abdullah Ocalan, Korkmaz dismisses this as an oversimplification.
“The DEM Party’s political space has been significantly narrowed during recent years. With the PKK weakened and the party under immense political pressure, there are few viable alternatives left for them,” she states. The motivations behind DEM Party’s support include not only ideological alignment but also practical benefits, such as reducing state-appointed trustees in local governance and securing the release of imprisoned politicians of the party.
As for the Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) involvement in the process, Korkmaz argues that it extends beyond simple electoral calculations. There is indeed a strong probability that the project aims to bring the pro-Kurdish DEM Party into the political mainstream while pushing the main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), to the margins. However, “viewing the initiative solely through this lens risks obscuring the broader picture. Regional dynamics, particularly those unfolding in Syria, are also shaping the contours of this political dialogue.”
‘This process bypasses the public’
Korkmaz explains that expecting broad grassroots participation in such processes is unrealistic within Türkiye’s current political culture. “It is debatable what ought to be, but people tend to follow their leaders rather than engage in bottom-up mobilization. Given how the DEM Party was demonized for years, even a simple handshake between party leaders can rapidly shift public perception,” she noted.
She also points out that past experiences, particularly the previous peace process, have led to widespread skepticism among both Kurds and Turks. “Public disappointment from the failed peace process has left deep scars, making broad-based support harder to secure. That’s why the government is framing this as ‘a Türkiye without terrorism’—a narrative that resonates more easily with the broader electorate.”
The failure of the previous peace process in Türkiye
Journalist Nagehan Alci emphasizes the shared responsibility in shaping public discourse to address those scars. She argues that the failure of the previous peace process was exacerbated by overwhelming public criticism, which eroded initial support. “After the disappointment surrounding the last resolution process, public backing nearly dropped to zero because everyone piled onto its failure,” Alci notes.
She suggested that rebuilding trust requires careful messaging—reassuring Turks that there is nothing to fear while signaling to Kurds that progress on fundamental rights is still possible.
“Each side must engage with its own base, understand its sensitivities, and persuade it accordingly,” she stressed. For the media, this means adopting a constructive tone rather than fueling anxiety. “There may be challenges, but the message should be that the process continues—as long as it does,” she says.
Author Yıldıray Ogur, the editor-in-chief of serbestiyet.com, on the other hand, contends that broad public engagement is not vital, asserting that the process is not about reconciling two communities but rather about the PKK’s renunciation of armed struggle. “This is ultimately Ocalan’s call and the PKK’s decision,” he explains. “The legal framework falls under the state’s purview, making this a process fundamentally centered on the PKK itself.”
“The public must, of course, be convinced,” the editor-in-chief acknowledged. “However, there is no additional effort to actively persuade society in this case. The previous peace process was markedly different—there was a concerted effort to engage the public. This time, that approach is absent since today, the state is stronger, while society has grown weaker.” Yet, despite this shift, the experience of the previous process adds an important contribution in shaping the current one, he remarked.
‘The project did not start with Bahceli’s statement’
Despite playing a relatively limited role in public, President Erdoğan’s influence cannot be ignored. Some argue that his motivations are purely electoral, aiming to secure another term in office. Others believe he genuinely seeks to be remembered as the leader who solved Türkiye’s most enduring security issue.
Nagehan Alci supports the latter view. She emphasizes that the potential for increased democracy as a side effect of the process is another critical point. “Solving the Kurdish issue will inevitably elevate Türkiye’s democratic standards, much like opening a window allows fresh air to enter a room,” Alci explains. However, she cautions that this process should not be mistaken for a comprehensive democratic reform effort.
Some interpret the MHP’s involvement as describing it as the hand of the government pulling the trigger. Some experts argue that the party’s motives go deeper. Yildiray Ogur stresses that the process is largely orchestrated by the state, with the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) playing a leading role.
“This is not an MHP-led initiative. The process is being managed primarily by MIT, just as previous negotiations were. Erdogan and Bahceli are following the intelligence agency’s directives,” Ogur explains. He added that Bahceli’s involvement provides legitimacy to the process, particularly among nationalist circles, by assuring them that it will not compromise Türkiye’s territorial integrity.
Timing is also a key factor. Ogur also notes that with shifting alliances and reduced external support for terror groups in Syria, Türkiye sees an opportunity to resolve its longstanding conflict with the PKK on more favorable terms.
A new chapter for regional politics
The renewed dialogue represents a pivotal shift in Türkiye’s political and security landscape, driven by both internal political recalibrations and evolving regional dynamics. While some view the process as a calculated electoral move by the government, others argue that it presents a genuine attempt to reshape Türkiye’s long-standing conflict with the PKK under more favorable geopolitical conditions.
However, the top-down nature of the initiative, the absence of public engagement, and lingering skepticism from past failures create significant challenges. The government’s narrative of a “Türkiye without terrorism” has framed the discourse appealing, but whether this simplification will generate sustainable public support remains uncertain and hinges on the gains of the project within time.
The high-stakes strategic gamble could redefine Türkiye’s governance model, alter party alignments, and shift regional power balances. The outcome of this process will not only shape Türkiye’s political trajectory but also influence the broader geopolitical landscape, reaching from Syria to Iraq and extending into areas ranging from trade to infrastructure development.
