Real problem with America’s blank checks lies elsewhere

On Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was berated in the Oval Office by U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President James David Vance, accused of persistently funneling American funds down a dead-end street. While the prospects of Ukraine’s resistance remain uncertain, Zelenskyy was nonetheless a head of state, representing a sovereign nation, and was therefore received accordingly.

The meeting, held in front of the cameras, unfolded as one of the most surreal spectacles in modern diplomatic history.

Yet, there exists a non-state actor—recipient of billions from American taxpayers—who represents no sovereign entity, will never be invited to the White House, and has even admitted to terrorist affiliations. During his first term, President Trump personally sought to curb this, only to encounter entrenched resistance from elements within the state apparatus.

“America First” was never meant to be an indefinite shield, and patience, much like political capital, is not limitless. Yet, in a region where leverage is as fleeting as allegiances, the realities of power are making themselves felt. Engaged in a conflict with no viable path to success within Türkiye’s strategic sphere of influence, YPG, an entity that has previously brokered deals with Russia, trained Antifa militants with American funds—despite Antifa being an avowed nemesis of Trump—and, in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, might align with Iran.

Billions spent on

The United States has provided billions in funding to the SDF, a coalition largely led by the YPG terrorist group, which is the Syrian derivation of the PKK, a terrorist group enlisted by the U.S. and EU. Between 2020 and 2024, this aid has come in the form of military support, stipends for militias, and funding for projects in areas under YPG control. 

Amid the heightened scrutiny brought by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) investigations, the question of accountability and transparency in U.S. taxpayer expenditures extends to Syria as well. 

Speaking to Türkiye Today, Omer Ozkizilcik, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, highlighted the multilayered nature of American support: “The U.S. support for the SDF takes various forms. It’s not just direct aid allocated by the U.S. Senate; there are also military expenditures, assistance channeled through USAID and nongovernment organizations (NGOs), as well as the involvement of American contractors operating in Syria. Accurately estimating the total cost of supporting the SDF remains quite difficult.”

There is no shortage of evidence to grasp the nature of these expenditures. Even after Trump’s 2019 declaration that it was “time to leave Syria,” the State Department alone sent a package valued at $400 million at once, largely consisting of security equipment. When pressed on the program supporting the militant group, the department responded in a written statement: “None of these funds will be allocated to security forces. The recently announced $720 million is entirely for humanitarian aid.” 

There is little need to scrutinize the exact figures. Trump made his stance clear during his first term, stating bluntly: “(YPG) were paid massive amounts of money and equipment.” His position on military engagement was just as unambiguous: “We will fight where it is to our benefit, and only fight to win.”

For the YPG, U.S. withdrawal would leave little to fall back on. Even with continued American backing, history offers a telling precedent. When  Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rapidly seized Damascus, the territories YPG abandoned without a bullet had once been sustained by U.S. funds—local administrations, infrastructure projects, and governance structures built with American support. All of them have since fallen into different hands.

Trump’s stance

Hundreds of millions of dollars were funneled into the group under train-and-equip programs as if the U.S. had an obligation to train these militias. Beyond ammunition, fortifications, and reconnaissance equipment, support extended to drones, night vision systems, and surveillance gear—along with funding for institutions meant to secure the group’s hold over captured territory.

The U.S. even footed the bill for 10,000 terrorists’ salaries each month. Yet, for years, concerns have persisted on the international stage regarding the presence of Antifa-linked elements within the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, the YPG. Some former Antifa members who fought in Rojava later returned to the U.S. and Europe, maintaining ties with militant leftist movements.

A contingent of American and European far-left foreign militia even formed their own English-speaking unit, the Antifa International Tabur. Piecing together equipment from YPG stockpiles and battlefield debris, they trained themselves until their fight in Syria ended. But war, for them, is not a final chapter—it is a cause that shifts with time. One day, they will return to their home countries, seeking a new adversary and it was Trump, whom they targeted in the past.

Among the Americans who joined the YPG, some were later arrested or placed under surveillance upon their return. In cities like Portland, Antifa groups have occasionally appeared in demonstrations waving YPG banners.

The Grand Old Party (GOP) has relentlessly attacked Biden’s support packages, arguing we should fix problems at home—the border crisis and economic struggles—before sending billions overseas.

Michael Arizanti

Democratic pet project

Michael Arizanti, a Middle East analyst at the Capitol Institute, argued that the Republican Party’s selective approach to foreign aid is striking. While MAGA Republicans oppose aid to Ukraine on the grounds of prioritizing domestic concerns, they have largely turned a blind eye to the extensive resources allocated to the SDF. Arizanti sees this as a contradiction, especially given the longstanding links between the SDF and the PKK—a group officially designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S.

The expert explained to Türkiye Today how this issue has largely flown under the radar: “MAGA Republicans talk a big game about ‘America First’ and claim to hate foreign entanglements and sending their tax dollars overseas. But when it comes to the SDF, they suddenly change their tune because the Pentagon wraps it in flag-waving ‘national security’ language. Supposedly fighting, Daesh sells well to their base, so they look the other way despite the obvious contradiction with their own stated values.”

The SDF has received less attention because it was never a major topic in the U.S. media, and perceptions of the group have largely been shaped by CENTCOM, which has repeatedly misled American public sentiment on Syria.

Omer Ozkizilcik

Middle East affairs author Arizanti traced the issue to a deeper bipartisan consensus. “The problem with the SDF situation is that both parties back these PKK fighters because they’re not seen as a Democratic pet project but rather as essential partners. Most Republicans don’t bother to understand or question it because it doesn’t make for good prime-time outrage fodder on their favorite news channels.”

A repeated debate

A June 2022 report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that Washington had spent around $45 billion between 2017 and 2021 on operations in Iraq and Syria—excluding several other forms of aid that remain undisclosed.

Reports surfaced on Feb. 5 regarding U.S. plans for a full troop withdrawal from Syria, with officials indicating that Trump and his advisers have shown renewed interest in the move. Pentagon officials have reportedly begun drafting exit strategies on timelines ranging from 30 to 90 days.

Trump’s new national security adviser, Mike Waltz, met with senior military leaders at U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida, on Friday for briefings on the Middle East, signaling that discussions on the matter are gaining momentum.

When questioned about the prospect of withdrawing troops, Trump offered a noncommittal response, stating that his administration would “make a determination on that.”

He downplayed the U.S. role in Syria, calling it “its own mess” and suggesting that Washington had no obligation to involve itself in every regional conflict.

A commitment beyond its cost

Meanwhile, speculation has emerged that Iran could step in to support the SDF should Washington cut funding—a scenario that some see as revealing deeper geopolitical undercurrents and the YPG’s pragmatism and loyalty, as a group that allied with the Assad regime in the past. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, however, dismissed the likelihood of such an outcome, warning that if Iran were to back the group, its own internal dynamics could, in turn, become a target for external support.

Nonetheless, Türkiye’s lack of nuclear capability does not make it an indefinitely pliable actor. Ankara has consistently shown that when its security interests are at stake, it does not hesitate to recalibrate its approach. The geopolitical landscape suggests that a shift in priorities may no longer be a matter of if, but when.